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Alfred Marshall is the most widely-cited source for defining what makes an industrial 
district (Marshall, 1890). For Marshall, districts emerge when one or more key local externalities 
for firms are present: (1) human capital efficiencies from shared pools of labor with industrial 
skills and knowledge, (2) transaction efficiencies of communication and transportation from 
proximity to specialized suppliers and buyers, and (3) knowledge spillovers from production 
know-how, technological developments, and knowledge about customers and markets. 
Marshallian externalities are internalized at the district level as firms locate and expand in 
response to local opportunities for market externalities. However, from the perspective of 
individual firms, they are positive externalities of locating in the district.  
            Subsequent research has extended our understanding of what makes a district by 
introducing the concept of a network of interdependencies among industry sectors (Chinitz, 
1961) and documenting the externalities of organizational relationships and district cultures as 
further sources of efficiency advantage.  Italian garment districts are well-known for 
collaborative production relationships and sharing of knowledge among local suppliers (Brusco, 
1982; Bigarelli, 2000; Bigarelli and Crestanello, 2004); Saxenian’s “regional advantage” 
documented the role of regional business cultures in promoting knowledge spillovers (Saxenian, 
1994); Porter (1994) emphasized the importance of active competition among spatially-
concentrated clusters of firms; and the mediating role of social relationships among workers and 
entrepreneurs in facilitating the blending of active cooperation with active competition has also 
been highlighted (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Reid, Smith, and Caroll, 2008).  
A major gap, however, remains in our understanding of the micro-foundations of local 
externalities making it difficult to explain the dynamics of why districts with similar firms and 
endowments evolve differently overtime (Montana and Nenide, 2008; Newlands, 2003). While 
we know that externalities and knowledge spillovers are critical to innovation, we do not know 
exactly how this happens and have little analysis of the internal organization of firms in relation 
to district development (Motoyama, 2008).  The micro-foundations of Marshallian externalities 
are rooted in the economics of atomistic markets in which individual firms have little 
independent influence on collective externalities. Yet many modern districts are dominated by 
large firms that have considerable local market power to shape local externalities (Giarratani, 
Gruver, and Jackson, 2007; Lundequist and Power, 2002; Doeringer, Evans, Terkla, 2002). 
2 
 
We have chosen initially to study the micro-foundations of district externalities in the 
apparel industry. Apparel is well known for being geographically concentrated in districts and 
regions and has long been cited as an example of an industry that relies heavily on Marshallian 
district externalities (Hoover and Vernon, 1962, Segal, 1960).  While it was once a major 
industry in industrialized countries, it has experienced sharp declines – beginning in the United 
States in the mid 1970s, in France and the UK in the 1980s, and in Italy in the 2000s -- as 
imported clothing displaced domestic production and as mass-market retailers with sophisticated 
off-shore sourcing practices replaced independent retailers as the primary outlets for domestic 
production.   
The loss of markets has disproportionately affected the large manufacturers that 
developed mass-production techniques to serve the growing demand in the early post-war period 
so that garment districts in high-wage countries are increasingly populated by large firms that 
have abandoned manufacturing and by small and very flexible firms serving a variety of small-
scale markets. The prevalence of small  and flexible firms and the replacement of mass markets 
with niche markets are suggestive of  the craft-based industrial districts engaged in flexible and 
specialized production that are featured prominently as an alternative to mass production in Piore 
and Sabel’s Second Industrial Divide (1984). However, the qualities that we observe in the 
garment districts we are studying are not typically those of skilled and largely-autonomous work 
groups engaged in flexible and specialized production. Rather we find districts with large, as 
well as small, craft-like firms and a variety of new organizational relationships among firms of 
different sizes of which networks of independent artisans and autonomous work groups are only 
one example.   
Instead of a return to districts based on craft production systems that often preceded the 
era of mass production, new models of districts are emerging in which flexibility and innovation 
are the key characteristics, regardless of size of firm or type of specialization. The firms that 
remain are increasingly “craft-like” in that they serve markets characterized by differentiated 
products, smaller orders, and often time-sensitive production, and their products are often sold 
through craft-like retail venues – boutiques and boutique-like specialty chains. Survival in this 
market environment requires special kinds of human capital – entrepreneurial skill for designing 
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or adapting products and organizing quick and flexible production and a skilled and experienced 
workforce that can switch products and complete production quickly. 
  Flexibility and innovation in these new districts can take the form either of intensified 
effort incentives embedded within a district culture of “command and control” hierarchies or of 
new products and new organizational arrangements being developed within a district culture of 
collaboration. We see these new incentives and innovative practices as resulting in a new class of 
“created” district externalities – externalities that arise from strategic business conduct and that 
affect the collective efficiency of industrial districts – that build upon the traditional externalities 
of shared labor and knowledge and contribute new sources of district advantage (Sammarra and 
Belussi, 2006; Camuffo, 2003).   
This paper documents the emergence of “new” industrial districts using evidence from a 
longitudinal and retrospective study of garment districts in France, Italy, the UK, and the United 
States. These studies find that traditional district externalities continue to matter as much or more 
to the smaller craft-like firms that survive than to the larger firms that are disappearing.  
Proximity to customers, fashion designers, and suppliers remains essential to information and 
transaction efficiencies because orders are small and production is time sensitive (Uzzi,1996; 
Cranton and Minehart, 2001); ready access to skilled and experienced labor pools is important 
for maintaining labor reserves because the remaining demand for domestic production is more 
volatile and uncertain;  and both proximity to customers and suppliers and the presence of shared 
labor pools are critical conduits for knowledge about products, skills, and production processes 
in volatile and uncertain markets.  
The transformations from large-scale to craft-like production and from traditional to new 
garment districts has occurred to varying degrees in the districts studied. These differences 
reflect national factors – economic structure, income levels and consumer preferences, and social 
and industrial policies – and different combinations of traditional and created advantages at the 
district level.  In addition, the speed and severity of import penetration is also a factor shaping 
how districts respond to change. Gradual import penetration allows firms to respond in ways that 
create new district efficiencies that draw heavily on existing business practices.  More sudden 
and severe import shocks disrupt these practices and result in newly-created externalities that 
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represent more radical departures from the past. The most dramatic rupture with the past is found 
in the French garment district Cholet, which was exposed to the sharpest import shocks of all of 
the districts studied and which created a variety of district externalities that almost completely 
transformed the Cholet garment district.  Conversely, the Italian districts studied are among the 
strongest examples of path-dependent district adjustment.  Being sheltered from import 
penetration by strong demand from independent retailers has allowed these districts to adapt in 
ways that build upon their existing externalities.  
Nevertheless, comparing the experience of these districts reveals three distinct patterns in the 
way firms and districts have responded to globalization that transcend national differences. The 
first focuses on strengthening traditional Marshallian externalities through training programs to 
upgrade the skills of local labor pools, subsidies for commercial space and research and 
development, and support for the dissemination of knowledge and know-how. The second 
involves building market incentives for higher effort and lower costs within districts. The third 
can be broadly described as Schumpeterian innovation by firms – new products, new and more 
collaborative supply chain relationships, entry into new markets, and new avenues for sharing 
knowledge – that collectively improve district advantage.  
 The following section summarizes the major industry structural characteristics of the 
apparel industry and the major trends that have affected garment districts in the four countries 
studied. Because these districts have much in common in terms of products, technologies, and 
market trends, there is a shared context for understanding how local clothing firms are 
contributing to new district externalities.   
The Transformation of Garment Districts 
The changes that have occurred over the last three decades in apparel supply chains, 
clothing retailing, and business strategies of apparel firms in the United States, the UK, France, 
and Italy have been addressed in a series of research papers by the authors (for example, 
Bigarelli, 2000; Bigarelli and Crestanello, 2008; Courault and Trouve, 2000; Courault and 
Doeringer, 2008; Crestanello and Dalla Liberra, 2005; Doeringer and Crean, 2006; Doeringer 
and Watson, 2000; Oxborrow, 2007). Rather than repeating the findings of these country studies, 
the balance of this paper will focus on the transformations in a specific group of garment 
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districts. However, some national context is useful as background for understanding how 
different districts evolve. This section will summarize the national trends using the United States 
experience, the country with the longest period of import penetration, while noting major 
exceptions in the other countries.  
Employment Decline 
Throughout the first half of the post-war period, apparel industries in the United States 
and Europe flourished as market demand expanded, large firms benefited from economies of 
scale and scope, and import competition remained relatively low. The 1970s, however, marked 
the turning point for the industry as clothing imports began to penetrate domestic markets. 
Between 1970 and 2005, loss of markets to clothing imports resulted in employment declines of 
88% in the UK, 80% in the United States, and 76% in France.  Italy, which remains a net 
exporter of clothing, avoided employment declines until the 1990s, but by 2005 Italian apparel 
employment was 28% below its 1970 level (Table 1) 
 
<Table 1 goes here> 
 
Changes in Retailing 
While the proximate cause of employment decline is imports, the timing of import 
penetration is very much related to changes in the structure and sourcing practices of retailers 
and large manufacturers.  The rise of mass merchandisers and new specialty chains in the United 
State in the late 1970s and a decade later in the UK was based substantially on their ability to 
develop overseas supply chains that provided products of high value to price ratios. However, the 
significant presence of large department and variety stores with efficient domestic supply chains 
somewhat slowed the market penetration by new mass retailers with offshore suppliers. 
Similarly, a strong independent retail sector provided an even more effective buffer against 
import penetration in Italy until the 2000s. 
The most extreme example of the effect of retailing on national garment industries is in 
France where new mass-market specialty chains specializing in short-cycle “mass fashion” 
products quickly revolutionized clothing retailing during the 1980s by outsourcing production 
and offering rapidly-changing fashion products at relatively low prices. These specialty chains 
quickly displaced the large sector of independent retailers that offered individualized fashion 
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products supplied on a two-season cycle by networks of domestic manufacturers and 
wholesalers.  
Changes in the structure of retailing also affected the control over branded products and the 
market power of retailers. The traditional structure of retailing in the United States involved a 
hierarchy of retail sectors. Department stores (Bloomingdales, Nordstrom), were the principal 
segment for products from manufacturers who controlled branded designs. Variety chains like 
J.C. Penney and Woolworths sold lower-priced “house brands” supplied by large domestic 
manufacturers and their contractors and similar products were offered through catalog chains 
such as Sears Roebuck and Montgomery Ward. Small chains and independent specialty shops 
have accounted for only a small fraction of U.S. clothing sales since the 1970s.  
Control over product innovation and brand names allowed many large manufacturers to 
exercise buying power over suppliers, to set markups and define minimum order sizes, and to 
dictate ordering and delivery schedules for retailers. In the United States, beginning in the early 
1970s, the ability to drive supply chains in this way began to shift from manufacturers to retailers 
(Gereffi, 1994). New mass retailer chains (specialty stores like the Gap and the Limited, and 
low-priced general merchandise chains like Wal-Mart) entered the market and competed 
aggressively against traditional retailers by developing their own product innovation capacity, 
establishing their own store brand names, and reducing prices by sourcing from new offshore 
suppliers rather than domestic manufacturers. As these new mass retailers gained market share, 
both traditional retailers and large manufacturers also began to source offshore, and independent 
retailers virtually disappeared.    
Between the growth of new retailers and consolidation among traditional retailers, buyer 
concentration increased substantially in U.S. retailing. The market share of the four largest 
women’s wear specialty chains rose from 11% to 30% between 1972 and 2002 (U.S. Census of 
Retail Trade, 1972, 2002) and mergers and acquisitions increased the market share of the four 
largest department store chains to 72% in 2002, up from 39% in 1972 (Table 2B). In addition, 
there was market entry by low-price mass merchandisers such as Wal-Mart and Target and the 
four largest firms in this new retail segment accounted for 95% of sales by 2002. This 
competition for retail market share between new and traditional retailers accelerated import 
penetration while at the same time increasing buyers’ power over prices and delivery schedules 
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in supplier markets both domestically and internationally. 
 
<Tables 2A & 2B go here> 
 The mix among retailing segments varies substantially among these countries. For 
example, independent retailers are no longer significant in the United States, whereas they 
remain the single most important sector in Italy (Table 2A).  In the UK, specialty stores (Next, H 
& M) have had the largest share of the retail clothing market, at about 25% since the late 1980s, 
followed by mid-market variety stores (Marks and Spencer, BhS) whose market share has fallen 
from 21% in 1988 to 12.5% in 2005.  Department stores (John Lewis, Debenhams) slightly 
increased their market share from 8.8% to 9.6% in this same period, but the major growth 
occurred among discount stores (Azda, Tesco) whose market share tripled, going from 3.6% in 
1988 to 10.9% (Oxborrow, 2007).  
 In France, the traditional structure of retailing was for major brand-name products to be 
sold through large luxury department stores (Au Printemps and Galleries Lafayette) with lesser 
brands of good quality and well-designed clothing being sold through a large sector of 
independent retailers. Low-end clothing was sold through hypermarket chains (Monoprix, 
Prisunic). Traditional specialty chains were the single most important retail clothing category in 
France.  
French clothing retailing, however, was particularly affected in the 1980s by a large 
group of new specialty chains (Camaieu, Etam) offering fashionable-looking women’s wear 
products at relatively modest prices and sourced from Asia and North Africa These specialty 
chains quickly took substantial market share from independent specialty stores and regional 
specialty chains and competed directly with department stores in markets for casual women’s 
wear More recently, large “hypermarkets” (discount stores like Carrefour and Leclerc) have also 
been a major factor in lower-end markets. 
 Italy represents the major exception to the U.S. and European pattern in that small-scale 
and independent shops continue to be the dominant retailing segment with almost an almost 50% 
share of the market. While large specialty chains (such as Benetton and Max Mara) and other 
large retailers (department stores (Coin, La Rinasente), hypermarkets, and variety stores) are 
gaining market share, these categories each accounted for less than 20% of clothing sales (2005) 
in the Italian market (Bocconi University, 2007). The strength of the independent retail sector 
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has sustained small craft-like producers in districts like Carpi while fashionable Italian branded 
manufacturers like Benetton and Diesel have their own retail specialty chains consisting of stores 
that provide a shopping experience similar to that of independent retailers. 
 Nevertheless, the overall trends are similar for all countries in that the market share of 
independent shops has been falling, and that of department stores market has remained more or 
less flat, while new specialty chains and large low-price retailers are gaining market share. In 
These countries have all experienced entry by large and aggressive mass market retailers during 
the 1980s. This retail challenge was led by specialty chains in the U.S. the UK, and most 
dramatically in France, and also by large discount retailers. 
The Shift from Large Firms to Craft-like Firms 
A striking feature of the decline of the apparel industry has been the substantial shift in 
the relative importance of large and small firms. Small firms have always far outnumbered large 
firms in the apparel industry, but as late as 1980 there was a small but significant large firm 
sector engaged in mass production that accounted for a large share of employment and output in 
the United States and most of the European countries studied. Five percent of U.S. apparel 
establishments had 250 or more employees in 1980. The UK large-firm sector (establishments 
with 200+ employees) accounted for 3% of all establishments while the corresponding figure for 
France was 9%. Italy, however, has historically had very few large firms. In 1971, there were 
only 140 firms with 250 or more employees (0.16%) while in 2005 there were fewer than 50 
firms in this category. 
By 2004, the most recent year for which data comparisons are available, the size 
distributions of firms in United States, the UK, and France has come to resemble that of Italy as 
large firms have mostly disappeared in these three countries (Table 3). Only 1% of U.S. apparel 
establishments have 250 or more employees and the corresponding figures for the European 
countries are all substantially lower, with only 0.4% of UK establishments having 250 or more 
employees, 0.3% in France, and 0.1% in Italy. Conversely, 79% of U.S. apparel establishments 
employed fewer than 20 workers, with percentages in the other countries being even higher – 
88% in the UK, 93% in France, and 94% in Italy. Nevertheless, there is evidence at the district 
level that large firms can survive if they have craft-like qualities of flexibility and quick 
responsiveness to market changes. 
<Table 3 goes here> 
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Changing Product Specialization 
Declining employment and the disappearance of large firms has been accompanied by 
changes in the product specialization and concentration of employment in many local garment 
districts. Most garment districts have always had a dominant specialization – men’s suits in 
Chicago, hosiery in Philadelphia, and women’s wear in New York. 
There are also specializations in fabric -- knitted or woven products, wool, cotton, linen, 
silk, and synthetics – and in market segments defined by fashion content, quality, and price. 
Basic commodities (knit underwear, hosiery, and household good) change very little from year to 
year and are mass-produced, sometimes using capital-intensive technology while fashion-basic 
products (dress shirts, casual slacks, and knit sportswear) have product cycles of 2-3 years and 
are produced using labor-intensive mass production techniques and highly-specialized labor. 
Among more fashionable women’s wear products the segments range from  “quick fashion” 
products featuring lower quality fabrics and rapid style changes to fashion products with high 
design content, costly fabrics, and excellent quality (higher-priced ready-to-wear fashion 
products, designer collections, and haute couture) with relatively small markets and product 
cycles of a season or less.  
Districts often have secondary specializations and the type and the degree of 
specialization often change over time. As the industry has declined in the United States, for 
example, capital intensive specializations such as hosiery and household furnishings (like 
curtains and draperies) have become more prominent. The largest garment districts of New York 
City and Los Angeles, however, continue to produce a wide range of labor intensive sportswear, 
women’s wear and other clothing products. During the 1990s, these districts gained a larger 
share of U.S. women’s wear production and Los Angeles displaced New York City as the 
leading producing district in the mid 1990s.   
A comprehensive study of garment district specialization in the United States during the 
1990s (Rice, 2008) has shown that overall specialization has increased while at the same time 
employment is becoming concentrated in the largest districts. This study also finds that 
increasing specialization reduces the rate of employment decline. Our European district studies 
also show high levels of product specialization, often in women’s and children’s wear, and at 
least in France there has been a consolidation of employment in a smaller number of districts.  
Hierarchical Contracting Networks 
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A distinctive structural characteristic of the industry is its reliance on quasi-vertical 
integration of production based on various kinds of contracting networks (Uzzi, 1996; Kranton 
and Minehart, 2001; Doeringer and Crean, 2006).  Traditionally, networks in the United States 
were based on hierarchical contracting by manufacturers and retailers either directly to 
contractors or through intermediaries known as “jobbers”. Large, and usually brand-name, 
manufacturers design products, buy fabric, perform pre-assembly activities like pattern-making 
and cutting, and assemble much of the production internally, while using smaller contractors for 
periods of peak production, simpler products (such as pants for 2-piece suits), and specialized 
tasks such as hand-sewing. For less standardized and higher fashion products, “jobbers” or small 
manufacturers often serve as intermediaries between large buyers and small contractors. Jobbers 
may acquire and cut fabric, but their main role is to commission contractors to assemble and sew 
garments according to designs supplied by branded manufacturers and retailers.  The efficiencies 
of this contracting system are those of low transaction costs coupled with a reserve production 
capacity that is quick, flexible, and competitively priced.  
Contracting of assembly work is a common feature of European districts as well, 
although with significant national variations. France followed the U.S. hierarchical contracting 
model closely, but with lesser reliance on jobbers or other intermediaries.  Manufacturers were 
responsible for designs, fabric acquisition, and some cutting as assembly, with one or more tiers 
of contractors and subcontractors performing the more seasonal and specialized components of 
production. UK supply chains had more vertical integration than those in the United States and 
France, with large textile suppliers owning captive apparel manufacturing facilities that would 
also contract seasonal work to small contractors, while the U.S. jobber model was commonly 
used for less-standardized products. In addition, the largest variety stores used “close 
contracting” arrangements with large suppliers to control and coordinate fabric acquisition and 
manufacturing. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, these strong vertical relationships 
disintegrated as outsourcing increased and a mixture of direct buying relationships between 
retailers and smaller local suppliers and of indirect relationships through intermediaries (both 
wholesalers and jobbers) took their place. 
Contracting in Italy is less hierarchical and more collaborative than in the other countries, 
largely because large manufacturers and retailers are less common in Italian supply chains and 
the production networks of small contractors retain substantial entrepreneurial responsibility for 
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production.  The “lead firms” (some large like Benetton and Diesel, but mainly small firms) in 
these collaborative networks are responsible for design, fabric acquisition, and the marketing of 
their products to both independent domestic retailers and to a variety of retailers in other 
countries. However, in contrast to the command and control management of hierarchical 
contracting and vertical integration arrangements found elsewhere, a relatively large fraction of 
production for these lead firms is delegated to networks of small and specialized firms that are 
allowed to organize production among themselves under the overall coordination of their lead 
firms.  
Comparing District Responses to Globalization 
Three major types of response to globalization are found in the district studies: (1) 
reinforcing traditional Marshallian externalities, (2) strengthening market and effort incentives, 
and (3) fostering innovation. Each of these response strategies are examined in this section 
(Table 4).  
 
Table 4: District Response Strategies   
     
Strategy  Districts   
     
Reinforcing Marshallian 
Externalities 
Nottingham (UK) Roanne (France) 
  
Market and Effort Incentives   New York City, Leicester (UK), 
  
Innovation 
 
Carpi & Veneto (Italy)), Cholet (France),  
   
 
Reinforcing Marshallian Externalities: The Roanne Garment District 
The Roanne region has long specialized in knitwear and is known for its high-quality 
sweaters and knitted shirts (Rerat et al., 1990). Roanne’s primary customers are independent 
retailers, department stores, and an emerging market among mail order companies. 
Before World War II, knitwear production in Roanne was conducted primarily by small and 
specialized craft-like firms. Demand growth in the 1950s, along with the capital-intensive nature 
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of knitwear technology and the advantages of vertical integration between knitting and clothing 
assembly favored the development of larger firms. However, the large firms relied on small 
contractors and craft workshops for finishing and dying processes and specialized skills gave 
these small firms a measure of economic independence from the large firms.  Nevertheless 
Roanne’s small firm sector occupied a dependent position within a hierarchical contracting 
system controlled by large firms (Rérat et al., 1990).  
The combination of the efficiencies of large scale production and hierarchical contracting, 
specialization in high-end knitwear products, and established market niches among independent 
retailers and department stores were temporary buffers against international competition and the 
growing influence of new national retail specialty chains in France. By the early 1990s, however, 
the decline in the independent retail sector and increased competition from fashionable Italian 
knitwear following led  Roanne’s most-progressive large firms to delocalize their production 
while the less progressive large manufacturers had closed along with the contractors and 
specialized firms that depended on them for orders. Employment in the mid 1990s (firms with 20 
or more employees) was less than one third that in the mid-1970s and only about 120 
manufacturers and 280 contractors and independent craft workshops survived.    
Responses to District Decline  
The principal response in Roanne was to strengthen the traditional externalities of the region 
– its pool of experienced workers -- and to stimulate knowledge spillovers.  Apparel firms and 
the local industry association sought government funding for an ambitious training program for 
employees at all levels from managers to technical specialists and production workers (the 
MUTEX  program). Training was seen as a way of enriching skills of the district labor pool and 
the MUTEX  program also sought to increase knowledge spillovers among the region’s apparel 
firms by making participation in the training program conditional upon a willingness to share 
business strategies and experiences with others (Houssel, 2004).  
Fifty firms (knitwear manufacturers, contractors, and related firms in the supply chain) 
initially participated in the MUTEX program and 2,450 employees and managers were trained in 
first two years of operation (Courault and Parat, 1998). An additional 20 firms joined the 
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program between 1999 and 2000. The vast majority, however, elected not to join the MUTEX 
effort because they were unwilling to share such proprietary information. 
Despite the narrow focus of the MUTEX  program on training and knowledge sharing, the 
program became the catalyst for a broader set of innovative responses. Training turned out to be 
the pretext for bringing firms together to realize more important benefits from informal 
discussions among the participants. The sharing of ideas and the brainstorming that it provoked, 
proved central to the development of new business collabrations in the region, including the idea 
of promoting a regional brand image. It also prompted firms to consider how their specific 
competencies could fit most efficiently into collaborative supply chains, thereby helping the 
district to shed its traditional hierarchical relationships and adapt quickly and decisively to the 
changing competitive environment.  
Local manufacturers began to cultivate new business relationships with retailers outside the 
region and some manufacturers obtained orders for the first time from apparel specialty chains 
that had not previously purchased mid-priced knitwear from Roanne. At the same time, 
production became more stable within the region as both large and small manufacturers began to 
diversify into woven garments to balance the seasonal demand for knitwear.  
The transformed production system in Roanne is illustrated by three medium-sized women’s 
high-fashion knitwear firms that built a strong network of local contractors, finishing firms, and 
fabric suppliers based on cooperative contracting relationships in place of the previous 
contracting hierarchies. This network provided the quick and flexible manufacturing platform for 
a series of further innovations -- increased design capabilities, development of branded products 
and coherent knitwear collections, intensified sales and marketing efforts, new supplier 
arrangements with large retailers, and diversified production into woven clothing (Parat and 
Courault, 2000). One of these firms went a step further by establishing a continuous design and 
creation capability to introduce new products throughout the year and founded a chain of retail 
boutiques to provide markets for its products. While these firms are also outsourcing production, 
they have kept much of their manufacturing capacity in Roanne (particularly the shorter 
production runs), along with their design and marketing activities. 
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 The experience in Roanne is one of mixed success.  The 70 firms that participated in 
MUTEX REPRESENTED only a small fraction of Roanne’s apparel industry. These were among the 
most progressive firms in the region, while the majority of firms that chose not to participate 
continued their traditional strategies.  Most of the participating firms prospered and those that did 
not largely experienced severe business difficulties including the failure of two well-known large 
manufacturers,  Le Gaillard and Desarbre (Le Monde, 2003). While jobs are still being lost to 
outsourcing, the MUTEX PROGRAM placed Roanne’s remaining firms on a much stronger 
competitive footing and the Roanne district is developing its own brand image (Rérat, et al., 
1992; Courault and Parat, 1998; Houssel, 2004).  
Nevertheless, most of Roanne’s contractors remain focused on the surviving larger 
manufacturers within the region. Because these manufacturers are losing their traditional base of 
independent retailers, this inward market focus has been an obstacle to success and the Roanne 
contractors are still searching for strategies that will help them to develop new markets to replace 
the traditional independent retailers. 
Market and Effort Incentives: The New York City and Leicester Garment Districts  
 These districts share in common a reliance on market competition and hierarchical 
contracting incentives as the primary sources of efficiency. In addition, New York City has 
developed a new form of effort incentives. Absent are collaborative supply chains and the range 
of innovative activity is limited.  
New York City 
The largest U.S. garment districts, New York and Los Angeles, have long benefited from 
traditional agglomeration economies provided by shared pools of labor, efficient local 
contracting relationships, and the transaction and information efficiencies derived from 
proximity to suppliers and customers (Kranton and Minehart, 2001; Uzzi, 1996). In addition, 
these garment districts have been able to cut costs by relying on a low-wage immigrant 
workforce, the productivity incentives of piece-rate compensation, and sweatshop labor 
conditions (Doeringer and Watson, 1999).   
The New York City garment district has always had a disproportionate share of small, 
craft-like firms that served women’s wear markets as well as a significant number of large 
manufacturers whose in-house manufacturing capacity was augmented by small contractors. This 
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gave the district the capacity to quickly produce a wide variety of styles and types of clothing in 
both large and small orders.  During the 1930s, for example, orders for the spring season placed 
in December could be delivered beginning in January (Carpenter, 1972) and reorders could be 
supplied in a week to ten days (Magee, 1930). By the end of the 1930’s, the New York City 
garment industry was producing 125,000 different styles of dresses in small lots of 250 to 1,000 
or more (Hochman, 1941).   
The New York garment district flourished during the immediate post-war period, fueled 
by strong domestic demand for fashionable women’s wear at moderate prices along with little 
competition from imports. Growing markets helped manufacturers to increase in size and add 
additional contractors, particularly those manufacturers with strong product design capabilities 
and well-established brand names.  
The Efficiencies of the Hierarchical “Jobber System” 
The New York City garment district relies heavily on the “jobber system” of hierarchical 
contracting, particularly to deal with volatile demand for fashion-sensitive women’s wear 
products. Manufacturers, and later retailers, either contract directly with small firms that can 
expand and contract their output and employment at relatively low cost or through “jobbers” who 
organize contractors to cut fabric into “parts”, sew the parts into fully assembled garments, and 
trim and finish the garments (Uzzi, 1996). Typically, each jobber works with a stable group of 
contractors with whom fluctuating orders are shared during each clothing season and this core 
group can be augmented by temporary contractors in periods of peak demand.  
Jobbers are responsible for supplying finished garments to manufacturers and retailers at 
a fixed price and their profits depend on the difference between the price they negotiate with 
manufacturers and the cost of contracted production.  Contractors, in turn, have to organize 
volatile production efficiently, fill orders quickly, and minimize labor costs. Jobbers rely on 
competition among contractors for orders to control unit costs while contractors controlled costs 
and promote speed and flexibility by relying on pools of low-wage and largely immigrant labor, 
piece rate pay incentives to motivate effort and speed production, and sometimes on sweatshop 
working conditions to reduce costs of plant and equipment. The jobber system reinforces 
traditional garment district externalities by reducing transaction costs in the contracting process, 
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providing quick access to local labor pools, and facilitating the sharing of product and production 
knowledge through continuing relationships among large buyers, jobbers, and key contractors. 
Employment in the New York garment district reached its peak in the mid-1970s and 
then began a long decline. The New York garment industry has seen a 65% drop in jobs 
from1980 to 2001(Chart 1).  Declines continued in the 2000s with a further 53% loss of jobs 
between 2000 and 2006 and a 42% decrease in the number of firms (Table 5A). Large suppliers 
have disappeared to the point where those with 100 or more employees are officially reported 
while 90% of all firms have fewer than 50 employees and account for 96% of all employment 
(Table 5B).  
 
<Chart 1 goes here> 
<Tables 5A & 5B go here> 
 
While New York City remains a major U.S. fashion center, housing the design and 
buying offices of many manufacturers and retailers, the demand for high-end fashions has been 
falling (Agins, 2000) and most retailers now rely largely on imports. Few large manufacturers do 
any manufacturing and instead focus on design, brand marketing, and sourcing from offshore 
supply chains. Even some smaller manufacturers have begun to outsource their production 
through collaborative arrangements with offshore production facilities in nearby countries, such 
as the Dominican Republic, and sometimes in China. What is left of domestic manufacturing is 
now concentrated among small manufacturers and jobbers and their small contractors.  
Two substantial changes have occurred, however, as production has declined in the New 
York garment district. One is that its district advantages have helped it to gain a larger share of 
national apparel employment, rising from about 17% in 1980 to almost 25% by 2001, and this 
trend has continued between 2000 and 2006. At the same time, the district has become more 
specialized than it was during the early period of post-war prosperity. Its specialization is 
women’s wear and its share of national women’s wear production has been growing steadily 
(Chart 2). In 1981, only half of New York City’s apparel workers were involved in the 
production of women’s wear, but that percentage has steadily risen to 65% in 1991 and to 71% in 
2001.  
<Chart 2 goes here> 
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Our surveys reveal that women’s wear firms, along with most of the other firms that 
survive in New York, now serve small niche markets. The highest value-added and most stable 
niches are in high quality, high-end women’s fashion products, custom-made men’s clothing, 
fashion women’s wear for regional chains and independent shops, and clothing using exotic 
technical fabrics that require considerable care and skill in manufacturing. Customers often 
include branded manufacturers (such as Ralph Lauren and Talbots), leading department stores 
(such as Barneys and Neiman-Marcus), and designers such as Liz Claiborne. 
More vulnerable niche markets include various middle-level products that are highly 
specialized -- surgical garments and “plus” size women’s garments – or involve special orders 
such as repair work on damaged shipments, rework of products that are not selling, and fill-in 
orders for low-end dresses and sportswear. This set of niche markets is characterized by small 
orders that are often commissioned through jobbers who contract with small suppliers and 
require supply speeds that cannot be achieved by large domestic suppliers or offshore suppliers. 
For example, the order fulfillment time for just-in-time inventory replenishment by large 
domestic suppliers is about 2-3 weeks (Abernathy et. al, 1995) and our field research suggests 
comparable supply speeds are currently available from Mexico and the Caribbean basin. 
However, 15% of the New York City suppliers surveyed can fill orders within a week or less and 
40% can fill order in 2 weeks or less.    
Leicester 
 The East Midlands region is one of the most significant regional concentrations of 
textiles and apparel supply in the UK with Leicester and for a long time Nottingham being the 
largest districts.   The region is characterized by small firms – average size 13 workers – 
although the region has historically had a higher concentration of large firms than others in the 
UK. As of 2005 region had 700 establishments employing fewer than 8,800 workers in woven 
apparel and another 100 establishments of knit and crochet garments.  
As recently as the 1990s, three patterns of buyer-supplier relationships were present in 
the region: closely-managed partnerships, informal and market-based  supply chain networks 
supplying quick response products for large fashion chains, and some collaborative engagement 
between suppliers and  smaller fashion-led retailers.  These relationships had evolved to be able 
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to serve the growing quick-turnaround needs among large-retailers that were striving to reduce 
inventories and the fast-fashion needs of smaller specialty retailers.  
The rise of outsourcing and the pressures to cut costs and rationalize supply chains, 
however, has sharply reduced the regions markets and eliminated both the closely-managed 
supply chain partnerships and the collaborative relationships with smaller chains.  The markets 
that remain are largely those of emergency repair work and short-cycle products.  
Leicester specializes in women’s wear using both knitted and woven fabrics and mainly 
aimed at young fashion markets.  Companies focus on contract manufacture rather than branded 
products, and Innovation is low.  As in much of the UK industry, relationships between buyers 
and small suppliers in Leicester are largely marked by low levels of commitment and trust, 
incompatible corporate cultures, and often adversarial commercial relationships.  
Responses to Globalization 
The New York City and Leicester garment districts have seen an intensification of traditional 
incentives of both markets and hierarchies. Both of these incentives have been strengthened in Leicester 
while New York City has developed a new type of effort incentive that combines both market forces and 
the incentives of the jobber system hierarchy. Leicester also has a new group of innovative contractors 
that are developing a design capacity while New York has been less successful in this area. 
Market Incentives  
Apparel firms in New York and Leicester face strong competitive pressures in both factor 
and product markets that encourage them to minimize factor costs, eliminate wasted time and 
materials, and move as rapidly as possible towards product specializations that take advantage of 
the agglomeration externalities of their districts. The efficiencies of market incentives have long 
been augmented by the transaction and information efficiencies of the hierarchical jobber system 
and the effort incentives of piece-rate pay. Market incentives have not only contributed to lower 
costs, but they have enhanced fast and flexible production under the jobber system. In Leicester, 
market incentives are becoming more important as the use of intermediaries such as jobbers has 
diminished. 
Hierarchy Incentives 
The hierarchical jobber system remains at the heart of the New York City garment 
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district, although there are also direct contracting relationships with large buyers. The traditional 
hierarchical relationships between contractors and buyers also remain in Leicester, but they are 
diminishing somewhat in importance as direct relationships with retailers increases. The 
traditional incentives of hierarchy, however, are being adopted in an intensified for by some 
retailers that keep their suppliers on “trial” status with unfavorable payment terms and limited 
orders for long periods, suppliers’ samples are given to lower cost competitors for 
manufacturing, penalties are levied for minor quality and delivery problems, orders are cancelled 
after fabric is purchased, and even those suppliers that have achieved “permanent” status are 
threatened with “delisting”. 
Excess Capacity Incentives  
 Beginning with the employment declines of the 1970s, however, a new type of “effort” 
incentive emerged in the jobber system as a result of excess production capacity and the 
intensification of the threat of business failure among contractors.  
Excess capacity is common in declining industries where capital retains its useful life 
long after it has been fully depreciated and the New York City apparel industry is no exception. 
The typical apparel firm in our field research sample has 20-25 employees and the capacity to 
produce 2,000 to 5,000 units a week. However, even after excluding sample shops, about one 
third of the firms surveyed typically receive orders averaging only 500 or fewer units. Even 
unionized shops, which tend to be larger and operate at somewhat higher levels of capacity 
utilization, still have enormous unused capacity. For example, the average employment of 
unionized contractors is 26, but they have the capacity to employ a workforce that is 60% larger. 
Similarly, they produce and average of 2,292 units a week, but have the potential to produce an 
average of 5,907 units a week for a capacity utilization rate of 39%. Excess production capacity 
is particularly severe among the smallest and the largest firms in our sample (Chart 3). Our 
estimates of excess capacity suggest that as many as half the contractors in New York City are 
economically redundant under present circumstances and that current output could be sustained 
with far fewer workers. 
<Chart 3 goes here> 
 
In addition to low overall capacity utilization, many small contractors are not capturing 
the full advantages of their workforce skills and ability to produce high-end quality products. 
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Our survey data documents considerable excess quality capacity as well as underutilized 
production capacity (Chart 4). For example, all 6 firms in our sample producing budget products 
can also manufacture moderately priced products, 5 can produce “better” quality products, half 
can do bridge and designer quality products, and one can even do haute couture collections. 
Although moving up to better quality and higher fashion products becomes more difficult at each 
level, two-thirds or more of the firms are capable of manufacturing products at least one step 
higher in quality and half are capable of moving up two steps or more. In short, there is a 
capacity to move up to higher value-added production that is not being tapped in the New York 
City garment district.  
 
<Chart 4 goes here> 
 
The average rate of excess capacity in the New York garment industry is far greater than 
the seasonal variation in demand and is far more than is needed to serve peak demand in a 
declining industry. Given the efficiencies of speed and flexibility of the jobber system and the 
strong pressures of competition in the New York City industry, it is hard to explain why there is 
so much excess capacity in the New York industry.  
Normally, excess capacity should be reduced by eliminating the least productive 
contractors so that the survivors can operate at efficient levels of output. The exit of firms may 
not occur immediately because dying firms only need to cover marginal production costs, but 
exit should be relatively quick in the apparel industry because it is labor and fabric intensive and 
capital depreciation is a minimal buffer to exit. When the industry first began to decline, the 
district did shed its least capable firms, while retaining enough excess capacity among core 
contractors to meet peak demand.  
What appears to be occurring more recently is that excess capacity is deliberately 
maintained by jobbers and manufacturers as an incentive to higher effort. Contractors are 
competing for orders more aggressively by working harder and cutting costs – speeding up 
production lines, working longer hours, providing better service to buyers, allowing safety and 
working conditions to deteriorate, and ignoring minimum wages and social insurance payments – 
the typical elements of a “sweatshop” industry. 
Jobbers and manufacturers optimize these effort incentives by adjusting excess capacity 
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among their contractors through the allocation of orders among a larger number of contractors 
than is necessary for efficient capacity utilization. While inefficient levels of excess capacity 
increase production costs and employing extra contractors increases coordination and transaction 
costs for jobbers, the ability to use their buying power to motivate greater effort, better service, 
and cost-cutting sweatshop practices can potentially offset these costs.  
Jobbers maximize their profits by choosing the number of contractors and the capacity 
utilization rate that equates the marginal costs and the marginal profits of excess capacity among 
their core contractors (see Appendix for a formal treatment of effort incentives). As long as 
contractors cover their variable costs, they remain in business and those that fail can easily be 
replaced in a declining industry. These incentive effects of excess capacity may explain why the 
number of firms falls far more slowly than employment as the industry declines. 
The extra profits that jobbers and manufacturers can earn from strategic excess capacity 
are protected from entry competition by the firm-specific organizational capital accumulated by 
jobbers through established relationships with their core contractors and core customers.  
Organizational capital also stabilizes jobber-contractor relationships because jobbers face 
replacement costs if contractors quit or are discharged and contractors that change jobbers are 
perceived as disloyal and costly to hire. 
This system of  “carrot” and “stick” incentives of maintaining excess capacity and 
allocating orders among core contractors within relatively stable contracting relationships 
accords with the findings of our field research. Jobbers explain their retention of core contractors 
in paternalistic terms. Their contractors have given them many years of loyal service and jobbers 
feel obliged to share whatever orders they receive among their core contractors in order to keep 
them in business. When contractors exit from the industry, it is their decision rather than that of 
their jobber, and jobbers then share the work that remains with their smaller group of core 
contractors. 
From the contractors’ perspective, however, jobbers are exploitive – only giving them 
enough orders to barely survive, always trying to cut prices, being slow to pay, asking for special 
considerations such as priority deliveries, paying unusually low prices for very small orders, and 
forcing the contractors to be at their beck and call at all times to discuss production and 
scheduling issues, often through face-to-face meetings at the jobbers’ offices. To some extent, 
sweatshop practices, paternalistic contracting, and reciprocal loyalty between jobbers and 
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contractors have always been a source of efficiency for the jobber system because they preserve 
the returns to investments in relationship-specific knowledge made by both jobbers and 
contractors. Contractors know their jobber’s products and customer needs and jobbers know the 
strengths and weaknesses of their different core contractors. This knowledge allows for better 
communication of product and production information and allows contractors to fill orders more 
quickly and efficiently when compared to “arms-length” contracting. Because the industry is 
declining and orders are shrinking, however, contractors’ dependence on their jobbers has 
increased and the effort incentives of the jobber system have been intensified by excess capacity.  
Product Innovation 
Leicester had a group of traditional contractors that worked through various 
intermediaries to provide quick-response production to fashion-oriented specialty chains, but 
global sourcing largely eliminated this market. In its place, however, is a cluster of about 60 
small and medium-size, fast-turn suppliers that specialize primarily in apparel design and limited 
volume manufacture. These suppliers have the capacity to rapidly and regularly update their 
portfolio of styles and to move quickly from product development to production.  
The main asset of these firms is their catalogue of samples ready to put into production. 
They firms generate samples within 2-3 days.  Lead times from orders to delivery are 2 to 3 
weeks for UK production if fabrics are available. Their clients include high volume and low cost 
specialty chains, middle market and lower volume fashion leaders and supermarket and discount 
chains with whom  the fast-design, fast fashion firms are increasingly contract directly, rather 
than through intermediaries.  
Firms in this fast fashion cluster typically have 10 to 30 employees with additional labor 
being recruited to support busy periods.  What sets them apart from other small contractors in the 
district is that they have 5-8 employees engaged in design, quality assurance, sourcing, and 
business development and sales compared to the more common practice of having one owner-
manager responsible for sales and production management and a part-time designer.   It is this 
design and sales team that supports rapid product innovation. In turn, retailers value the fashion 
input of these suppliers, to inject newness into collections and ensure that emerging fashion 
trends are captured. 
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Seasonal collections are no longer the main product of these fast-fashion firms that 
continually develop new designs.  Much of the design and product development, however, is 
limited to style progression and adapting popular trends.   The designers describe the weekly 
cycle of new styles as “churning them out”.  
In addition, Leicester has a thriving community of new design-led micro-businesses with 
2-3 employees serving a variety of markets from exclusive and custom-made high-end fashion to 
freelance design and technical services for the mass market.  These firms are being started by 
recent graduates of fashion and design programs in the region as well as by designers who have 
lost their jobs as part of the restructuring of large firms. They often develop their own collections 
and branded products that are sold through their own boutiques and also through small retail 
outlets. Success is limited, however, and there are high rates of business failure.   
About one quarter of the firms in the New York City sample also have design capabilities 
and can make patterns and samples, and 80% of these firms have the operating capital needed to 
purchase fabric. These are the foundations from which entrepreneurial contractors have been 
able to become “full package” suppliers or full-fledged manufacturers. These entrepreneurial 
efforts are being supported by an industry association, the Garment Industry Development 
Corporation (GIDC), that is fostering partnerships between contractors and younger designers, 
working with contractors and retailers to promote “full package” supply chains in the district, 
conducting business for contractors and skills training for their employees, and helping to open 
export markets. The development of this product innovation capacity by contractors, however, is 
far behind that in Leicester. 
 Managing Outsourcing 
A number of the firms in the fast fashion cluster in Leicester outsource production to 
lower labor cost countries, in order to offer retailers a choice of price, volume and lead time 
options. Most of the fast fashion firms have contracting relationships in low-cost locations -- 
Eastern Europe, Turkey, Morocco, and sometimes in the Far East. However, managing overseas 
capacity is very resource intensive for the smaller firms and has often been abandoned.  
Innovation Strategies: The Cholet, Veneto, and Carpi Garment Districts  
 The third type of district response to globalization involves intensive reliance on 
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innovations in products, organizational relationships, and business strategies. Innovations range 
from those that adapt existing district practices (Carpi and Veneto) to those that radically 
transform district cultures (Cholet).  Nevertheless, these districts that rely on innovation 
strategies are converging around a common set of practices based on frequent product 
innovation, increased flexibility, product innovation, and collaborative supply chain 
relationships, and in some cases include downstream integration into retailing, and the 
management of outsourcing.  
 
Veneto 
     Veneto is an old textile and apparel region located in the Northeast of Italy with large garment 
districts in Treviso, Vicenza, Padua and Verona. It is home to 686 final firms and 2,508 
subcontractors employing respectively 23,716 and 31,349 workers (2004), and numerous self-
employed artisans (Table 6).  
<Table 6 goes here> 
During much of the post-war period, Veneto was characterised by the presence of large 
and vertically-integrated apparel firms that employed thousands of workers and often engaged in 
hierarchical contracting. Beginning in the mid-1970s, however, Benetton and other many large 
firms began a process of vertical disintegration in which production was largely transferred to a 
network of small, flexible, and lower-cost subcontractors, while the large firms specialized in 
design and marketing activities.  Employment in the Veneto apparel industry increased into the 
1980s and remained stable in the early 1990s. However, between 1993 and 2004 the Veneto 
industry lost 1,650  firms (-34%) and 31,000 jobs (-35%), particularly among contractors as large 
firms began to outsource production. Meanwhile the region is retaining manufacturing activities 
where labor costs are less important -- the production of samples, reorders of merchandise, fast 
production and products made with expensive materials – and new types of vertical integration 
are emerging as some large firms establish production facilities abroad and as companies like 
Benetton and Diesel expand their own retail chains.  
Carpi 
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The Carpi garment district is located near Modena in the Emilia Romagna region.  The 
knitwear industry came into being after World War II and grew rapidly during the 1950s with 
employment  increasing from 1,700 in 1951 to 6,400 in 1961. Employment continued to rise in 
the 1960s and 1970s, reached a peak of around 15,000 in 1981 as the district diversified into 
woven clothing products, and then slowly declined until the early 1990s when even sharper 
declines set in. Between 1990 and 2006, the knitwear and clothing industries in Carpi 
experienced a 49% drop in the number of firms and a similar loss (48%) in employment (Table 
7).  The value of production, however, fell by only 8% in constant prices during this period and 
has been increasing since 2000 as production has shifted towards higher value-added products. 
By 2006, the apparel industry of Carpi had 1,158 firms with 7,239 employees -- 310 are lead 
firms with 3,678 employees and 848 sub-contractors with 3,561 employees  
 
<Table 7 goes here> 
 
In contrast to the Veneto districts, Carpi consists almost exclusively of small and 
medium-size firms that are completely independent of large manufacturers (Table 8).  Small-
scale “final” firms produce and market medium to high-end, but unbranded, fashion products of 
their own design. The main market for these products is small independent retailers and 
wholesalers, although Carpi manufactures some house brands for larger European retailers.  
 
<Table 8 goes here> 
 
Final firms rely heavily on the many small subcontractors that are specialised in a single 
stage of production. Production runs are very small among these local subcontractors with 
orders of mostly 100 – 400 units.  These  local contractors are very small and flexible (an 
average of 4 employees per firm), they concentrate mainly on one single production stage, and 
half employ no wage labor. Only a small fraction of contractors are  able to perform or organize 
the entire production process.  The majority of the subcontracting firms make prototypes, 
samples and small production runs, and they collaborate in making sample collections. Among 
the subcontractors of the district the largest groups consists of knitwear weavers and 
embroidery firms (both capital-intensive), followed by  firms specializing in the final stages of 
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the production cycle -- ironing, quality control and packaging.  Unlike the hierarchical 
contracting relationships that once characterized Veneto and that continue in New York City, 
Carpi’s contractors work with many different final firms and the largest may also work with 
final firms outside the district.  
Unlike Veneto, the declines in employment and firms in Carpi have been 
disproportionately concentrated among final firms, particularly the handful of large final firms 
producing standardized men’s wear (sportswear, knitwear, shirts) and a number of smaller final 
firms engaged in the production of pronto moda (quick-response production of medium-low 
quality, but fashionable, products with a time to market of 10-15 days). Among contractors, the 
firms that have suffered the most drastic downsizing are those that perform the more labour-
intensive sewing opeations.  
By the end of the 1990s, Carpi’s production was concentrated among medium and small 
firms, but by the 2000s the composition of firms in Carpi has shifted towards somewhat larger 
mid-sized final firms (50-249 employees) and sub-contractors (10-49 employees), while the 
share of its very largest and very smallest firms has declined. The net result is that, while Carpi 
remains a district of small and medium-size firms the average size of firm has increased along 
with the share of output accounted for by the largest final firms.  
Cholet 
Before World War II, Cholet was primarily a textile area involving small-scale ‘workshops’ 
(mainly specializing in linen) and small and medium-size industrial firms producing cotton 
textiles. The transformation from a textile region to a garment region began during World War II 
when Cholet textile traders began to manufacture simple children’s wear products and the 
growth of post-war demand helped Cholet’s apparel industry to grow substantially into a broad-
based garment industry based on large-scale mass production methods. 
The apparel industry was well-established by the 1960s and 1970s and it had come to 
specialize in women’s and children’s wear. The largest firms (such as Albert and Newman) had 
developed well-known regional brands that were sold to independent retailers and small regional 
chains. By the late 1970s, large firms employed about 8,000 people and they engaged in 
hierarchical contracting with smaller firms that accounted directly or indirectly for another 6,000 
workers.  
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However, the growth during the 1980s of new specialty chains selling lower-cost, imported 
apparel products destroyed Cholet’s traditional markets. Employment in medium and large firms 
(those with 20 or more employees) fell to 8,439 by 1993, and to 6,178 by 2003.  All of the large 
firms that relied on the efficiencies of mass production manufacturing and hierarchical 
contracting closed during the 1980s and 1990s.   
The loss of its traditional markets and the mass closing of most of its large firms triggered a 
major restructuring of the Cholet clothing industry. These visible changes, however, were 
accompanied by a number of less-visible transformations in the business strategies and economic 
relationships among the firms that remained. What is remarkable about these transformations is 
that they originated with contractors who were previously dependent upon large manufacturers 
for orders and direction. The remaining contractors were able to find new markets, adopt new 
business strategies, and develop new business relationships and the few large firms that survived 
went through a similar transformation.  These changes facilitated a new emphasis within the 
district on higher fashion and better quality products and the firms that remain have developed 
new competencies linked to the creation and development of products, speedier manufacturing 
and logistics, and newly-developed supply chains.  
District Responses 
All three of these districts have responded to the shocks of globalization by introducing 
significant innovations in products, supply chains, and other business strategies. While the extent 
of the job losses due to rising imports and the trends in the mix between large and small firms 
varies among these districts, the common elements in the district responses outnumber the 
differences. Craft-like flexibility and entrepreneurial behavior characterize both smaller 
contractors and larger final firms, even in Veneto where large final firms remain the driving 
force in the region. Hierarchical contracting has been abandoned everywhere in favor of 
collaborative supply relationships within the districts. Product innovation is increasing both in 
terms of numbers of products and their fashion content. Outsourcing of production tends to be 
managed locally, at least for less standardized and more fashionable products. And the 
development of branded products and downstream integration into retailing are present in all the 
innovative districts, including Carpi. 
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Craft-like Entrepreneurial Conduct 
The dominant characteristic of  the firms that survive in these three districts is the prevalence 
of entrepreneurial conduct. For example, the speed and severity of the demand shock in Cholet 
quickly destroyed traditional markets and most of the large firms that had provided economic 
leadership in the district. As the era of large firms ended, their contractors that survived had 
found new sources of orders and new lines of business – finding new customers, turning to 
medium and high fashion products, and entering  new markets related to global outsourcing.  
Italy’s labor crisis of the 1970s provided a similar shock to the Veneto region, which led to 
an innovative restructuring of production in which large and inflexible firms transfered much of 
their manufacturing to small and flexible contracting networks. A second shock hit Veneto’s 
contractors beginning in the 1990s as large firms outsourced relatively standardized production. 
This led to a winnowing contractors with the survivors repositioning themselves to serve smaller 
niche markets for more expensive products requiring quick delivery times. 
Unlike the other districts, Carpi was always a district of small and entrepreneurial lead firms 
that designed their own products that were sold under their own brands to a large domestic 
market of independent retailers. This market has been largely protected against the shocks of 
global outsourcing until recently when Carpi began to lose markets to imports. In response, the 
district’s entrepreneurial conduct has been redirected towards improving the quality and range 
of its products, diversifying distribution channels, and seeking new markets. 
 Craft-like entrepreneurial behavior is not limited to small firms. The large firms that 
survive in Cholet and the large firms that are dominant in Veneto also rely on entrepreneurial 
conduct – developing new markets, product innovation, and supply chain reorganization. The 
few large firms that survived, for example, chose between two new strategic options – continuing 
their core business by outsourcing production to low wage countries or developing strong brand 
names.  
Districts that are dominated by entrepreneurial firms and innovation acquire a very different 
culture from those of traditional districts dominated by command and control hierarchies and 
entrepreneurial districts provide a hostile environment to traditional firms.  Innovation increases 
competition and contributes to the destruction of the old industrial model built on scale 
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economies, mass production, and hierarchical contracting. Entrepreneurial firms are more 
outward looking in their search for new markets and have more efficient supply chain 
relationships, both locally and globally. Local supply chain collaborations foster collective 
problem-solving and collective innovation in ways that had not occurred in hierarchical supply 
chains. In the case of these three districts, the promotion of outsourcing by entrepreneurial firms 
has also contributed to the decline of traditional firms.  
Craft-like Product Innovation and Specialization 
All three districts invested heavily in product design and product innovation. In Cholet 
and Veneto these investments  were made primarily by large firms to strengthen their brand 
names whereas small lead firms were the innovators for non-branded products in Carpi. Product 
innovation is all cases was biased towards specialization in more fashionable and higher value-
added products that were suitable for quick and flexible production.   
Many Veneto firms have increased the flexible part of their production by augmenting 
the two traditional seasonal collections (spring/summer and autumn/winter) with additional off-
season collections and by offering a larger number of products. Between 1993 and 2004 the 
percentage of such production rose from 17% to 25%. Similarly, Benetton changed its 
traditional production calendar of two seasonal collections with 80% of the production for 
orders collected before the selling season and only 20% by reorders and mid-season product 
introductions (“flash” products), by creating split seasons (Moda 1 and Moda 2) and making 
mid-season introductions of two micro-collections (“Trends” and “Design”). This proliferation 
of products outside of the regular seasonal cycle of fashion programs obliges firms to have 
faster and more flexible production in order to reduce the time-to-market and to monitor the 
market demand constantly.   
Under the pressure of growing competition in the low and medium price bands, Carpi has 
followed a pattern of product innovation based on a strategy of upgrading and repositioning 
products towards the medium-high end of the market and has substantially increased its 
employment of professional designers. Currently, 61% of the final firms produce for the 
medium-high end products and 13% produce for luxury markets, only 14% make products of 
medium-low quality, and the remaining firms serve other markets. The district has also 
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diversified the range of products by adding many kinds of woven clothing products for women 
and girls. Traditional knitwear production is no longer the main specialization of the district. 
Almost 90% of the output of the district is based on designs by local final firms, with only 7% 
of designs supplied by large retailers.  The 300 final firms in the district are estimated to offer 
almost 98,000 product models a year or over 325 models per firm. As a result, production runs 
are getting shorter and faster. 
 The development of brand names has also been a dimension of product innovation. 
During the past 20 years, Cholet has become the leading district for branded children’s wear; 
Veneto is dominated by large brand name suppliers such as Diesel.  Even Carpi is seeing many 
firms investing in the promotion of their own brands (Blumarine, Liu-Jo, A-style and Gaudì) in 
order to become more visible to final consumers, though few of them yet have well-known 
brands. 
Greater product specialization has accompanied these changes. Cholet, for example, is 
primarily a producer of higher-end children’s wear, with small and medium-size firms serving 
high fashion markets (Christian Dior, Yves Saint Laurent, Kenzo) and others focusing on lower-
priced market niches -- “quick fashion”, mid-level fashion, and sportswear, while Veneto 
remains broadly specialized in branded products and is moving towards the high end of the 
market.  Women’s wear production has increased in Carpi, especially for young women, 
whereas that of men’s wear has fallen. 
Not all product innovation is successful, however, as shown by the experience in Carpi 
with introducing pronto moda products -- medium-low quality products that are quickly 
designed and brought to market (in contrast to products known as “programmato” that are 
designed one year in advance of sales and are produced on the traditional seasonal calender). In 
the 1980s, the pronto moda firms anticipated the “quick response” strategies adopted by the 
Italian large producers, reducing the time to market to ten-fifteen days, from design of the item 
to delivery of the finished product. At the end of the 1980s, pronto moda production accounted 
for 40% of the district turnover, but during the 1990s it dropped to 14% as consumers paid 
greater attention the relationship between price and quality. 
Craft-like Flexibility and Speed  
 Serving smaller and more fashionable niche markets has enhanced the value of speed and 
flexibility of production. The near total disappearance of large firms in Cholet in the 1980s left 
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behind a quick and flexible response capability for supplying samples and other niche markets 
where speed is important. Similarly, only 17% of the Veneto subcontractors now produce on 
long runs compared to 58% in 1993. Because of the preponderance of small firms and 
contracting networks, craft-like flexibility has long been a part of the Carpi district.  
Even large firms became more craft-like in that they specialized in more skilled activities 
such as design, marketing and coordinating outsourcing. Interestingly large firms in both Cholet 
and Veneto are becoming more flexible by reorganizing large scale production more distinctly 
into more flexible and less flexible segments. The outsourcing segment is specialized in less 
flexible production of standardized products, the more flexibile production is contracted through 
collaborative networks of small local contractors, while the large firms specialize in the most 
flexible areas of design, increased product differentiation, and marketing. 
Collaborative Supply Relationships 
The demands of new niche markets, shorter product cycles, and faster production have 
brought major changes in organizational relationships within supply chains and innovations in 
both vertical and horizontal supply chain relationships have become more prominent in the three 
districts studied.  
In place of the hierarchical, “command and control” relationships between dominant large 
firms and their dependent contractors, small and mid-size firms in Cholet have developed a 
variety of more collaborative relationships among themselves -- formal joint ventures, co-
contracting and informal collaborations among independent firms, and “kinship networks” of 
firms owned or managed by members of the same family. These networks provide the district 
with the flexibility both to serve higher-fashion markets where order sizes are smaller and the 
pooled production capacity to operate on a relatively large scale when necessary.  
While Cholet’s firms have their own market niches and customer bases, these collaborations 
have allowed many contractors to develop the capacity for producing the entire products from 
models and samples and to full collections. One such partnership among four high fashion 
contractors brought together design and product development, fabric purchasing, and 
warehousing and shipping with manufacturing in Cholet and outsourcing abroad. While 
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hierarchy and dependency continue to influence relationships with large buyers outside the 
region, those contractors that have diversified into product design and the management of 
outsourcing are developing increasingly collaborative business relationships with many of these 
buyers. 
Collaboration by contractors with their final firms in preparing the collections and providing 
various additional services has long been noted as a strength of the Carpi district. However, the 
growing fragmentation of orders and the growth of short production runs is causing frequent 
interruptions in production and discontinuous work so that excess capacity is becoming more 
common in the district, particularly among knitwear weaving firms.  
 
 Managing Outsourcing 
Outsourcing and other sources of import penetration have become more common in all three 
districts, but much of this outsourcing is coordinated by firms in the district. The coordination 
allows the districts to control the balance between domestic and imported production, and has 
further sharpened the distinction between large-scale production of lower quality products and 
more craft-like production for niche markets. This may change, however, as the quality of the 
products made abroad is increasing and foreign producers have begun to accept orders for short 
production runs. 
In Veneto, outsourcing is managed mainly by the large branded firms. Firms like Grotto and 
Campagnolo have replaced their Veneto contractors with vertically-integrated factories in 
Eastern Europe, North Africa, and South Asia. Benetton has adopted a different approach by 
inviting its contractors to set up firms in Eastern European countries to take advantage of the 
organizational relationships with its existing contracting chains to supply mass-produced 
products at lower costs. In addition, several small artisan entrepreneurs have established new 
firms in Eastern European countries, mainly Romania, to serve as satellite suppliers for their own 
final firms (Crestanello and Tattara, 2006).  
Carpi also experienced sourcing outside the district beginning in the 1970s when  local firms 
delocalized part of their production to lower cost districts in Italy – first to the neighbouring 
regions of the Lombardy, Veneto, and Emilia Romagna and in the 1980s to Southern Italy. In the 
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late 1990s and the early 2000s, some medium and small final firms (20 to 100 employees) have 
invested in in East European production facilities and  the district has been sourcing the more 
standardized and basic products with medium-long production runs (in excess of 5,000 units)  to 
China, Turkey, and Eastern Europe. Today, 64% of the production is done by regional 
subcontractors (half of it located in the district), 21% by subcontractors in other Italian regions, 
and 15% by subcontractors abroad. As in Veneto, the increased quality of products and the 
growth of very small orders with shorter production times has favored local subcontractors.  
In Cholet, both larger brand firms and smaller contractors are engaged in outsourcing. Those 
large firms that remain in Cholet, like Groupe Salmon Arc-en-Ciel (GSA), rely almost 
exclusively on foreign contracting to low wage countries, first to Morocco and later on to 
Romania, while strengthening their own design capability, producing sample collections for their 
traditional retail clients, and developing their own brands.  As in Veneto, some contractors have 
also begun to manage delocalized production for large companies in the region and elsewhere. 
 Vertical Integration Into Retailing 
Veneto has a well established group of large manufacturers, with well-known brands that sell through 
their own stores or through a network of franchising outlets. The surviving large firms in Cholet that 
developed their own brands have also adopted this model. The best example of this combination of 
branding and manufacturer-owned retailing is Catimini, a producer of a range of high-fashion, high-
quality, high-priced, and branded children’s wear products. By the end of the 1990s, Catimini had 
acquired about 200 shops in France and other countries and supplied about another 100 franchise 
operations.  Because of the small size of final firms and the lack of well-known brands, only a few 
medium sized final firms have their own stores or control franchising chains and this limitation is likely to 
have a larger impact on Carpi in the future and its domestic market among independent retailers continues 
to contract.  
Conclusions 
This paper documents the micro-foundations of newly-emerging district externalities in 
the apparel industry being created by the firms that survive in the face of growing import 
competition. The case studies of garment districts presented in this paper show that surviving 
firms tend to be more “craft-like” in their conduct than those that fail in that they are quick and 
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flexible in their production methods and tend to serve markets for more individualized products 
with short product cycles.  
The specific adjustments in each district introduced by these craft-like firms tend to be 
path dependent in that they are shaped by the institutional history of the district and the nation-
specific structure of downstream retailers and other buyer markets, but when economic shocks 
are sudden and severe, history is less important and there are major discontinuities in the 
evolution of district practices.  New York City, Roanne, Carpi, and the Veneto region all show a 
strong imprint of path-dependent district evolution. The Cholet district is the best example of a 
shock that created a widespread and unanticipated transformation from a district that relied on 
traditional externalities, traditional efficiencies of hierarchical contracting, and economic 
leadership by large firms to one in which small contractors are the leaders in product and 
organizational innovation. 
The responses of these craft firms to global competition can be explained by one of three 
models of new agglomeration economies – stronger traditional externalities, intensified effort 
incentives, and entrepreneurial innovation. Regardless of the industrial structure, degree of path 
dependence, and the rate of district transformation, there are strong similarities in the adjustment 
strategies among the districts represented within each model of response to global competition.  
The Los Angeles garment district exhibits many of the same kinds of market and effort 
incentives as the New York City district (Bonacich and Appelbaum, 2000; Ross. 2004: Rosen, 
2002) as does much of the Leicester (UK) district. The Nottingham (UK) district resembles 
Roanne in many ways with its reliance on governmental programs to strengthen traditional 
externalities. Similar adjustment characteristics are found in the innovative districts of Carpi, 
Veneto, and Cholet, despite major differences among these districts in product specialization, 
size of firm, and severity of competitive shocks. 
The model of strengthening traditional district externalities through various forms of 
training and technical assistance is likely to prove insufficient in the long-term to overcoming the 
disadvantages of high wages, outdated plant and equipment, and the transfer of manufacturing 
knowhow and experience to offshore suppliers in an era where large buyers are using their 
market power to continually improve the efficiencies of global sourcing.  The example of 
Roanne’s Mutex program reveals the limitations of this approach, but it also shows that such 
programs can facilitate transitions towards more entrepreneurial responses in unanticipated ways.  
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The most obvious candidate for ensuring future district survival is the entrepreneurial 
model of district innovation. One could see a bright future in which the garment districts that 
survive will be those where craft-like and entrepreneurial firms of all sizes continue to use their 
speed, flexibility, and network advantages to support greater product innovation, secure 
organizational improvements in supply chains, coordinate domestic with offshore contracting, 
and promote downstream integration into retailing.  
The variants of this entrepreneurial district model that can now be found in France as 
well as Italy, offer a competitive alternative that relies on adding value to products and 
production processes rather than depending on higher effort and other cost-cutting measures to 
remain competitive in global apparel markets.  Innovative districts have found a variety of niche 
markets and branding strategies that are less vulnerable to global competition by linking quality 
and speed to fashion, while remaining price-competitive in more standardized products by 
managing the delocalizing of production to nearby countries with lower wages. However, 
innovation is hard to sustain and can often be quickly imitated so that it may be a difficult model 
to sustain in the long term. 
The incentives model of the New York garment district is unmatched at motivating effort, 
flexibility, and speed among contractors. These qualities, along with other cost-cutting 
sweatshop methods have allowed New York to serve a wide variety of market niches that are too 
small, too specialized, and too time sensitive to be entered by the lowest cost foreign suppliers.  
So long as such niches are available, New York offers a quick and flexible manufacturing 
capacity that can handle a wide range of products and order sizes.  However, our survey of 
manufacturers and contractors finds that foreign competition is perceived as the dominant threat 
to the New York industry. A number of manufacturers serving markets with relatively high-value 
and time sensitive products are beginning to move all or most of their current production to the 
smaller suppliers in the Caribbean and there are few signs of new markets emerging in New 
York to replace those that are lost. 
The New York garment district has also shown little ability to generate the kinds of 
innovations that are found in Cholet, Veneto, and Carpi, or even that found in Leicester’s fast 
fashion cluster. Large manufacturers, jobbers, and retailers have preempted opportunities for 
entrepreneurial product design and they also control the major outsourcing and commercial links 
with global markets. Only a handful of New York’s small manufacturers and jobbers have 
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connections to global markets, mostly through outsourcing and joint ventures with foreign 
suppliers, while contractors have no connections whatsoever. The jobber system locks 
contractors into hierarchical and dependent contracting relationships that deter the kinds of 
collaborative relationships with other contractors that are found in Cholet and Carpi. And most 
important, by keeping contractors at the margin of survival by creating excess production 
capacity and by adopting effort incentives, dependent contractors have little time or resources to 
develop new markets.    
Our survey also finds that in the midst of substantial decline, the New York City apparel 
industry is still attracting new firms and new capital.  Over one fifth of the firms in our survey 
had entered the market since 2000 and many of the owners of these new firms reported various 
forms of entrepreneurial and strategic behavior.  This new generation of owners is well aware of 
the current business environment of excess capacity, import competition and capital shortages. 
Unlike the older generation of business owners who entered the garment industry in a more 
prosperous market environment and are now focused on issues of day-to-day survival, these new 
entrepreneurs are prepared to address these problems.  Nevertheless, truly entrepreneurial firms 
are rare in New York City and the district remains vulnerable to import competition and 
declining demand.  
Each of these district models has its own logic for improving district advantage and 
raising the odds of district survival and each also has downside liabilities. The obvious question 
is whether there is a “best practice” model that has the capacity for sustaining district advantage? 
The answer to this question depends on the metric for measuring success. The readily-
available measures of district performance are largely limited to employment, the viability of 
firms, and the value-added by district product. While none of these measures is likely to yield 
precise and unbiased measures of district-level trends in an industry like apparel where the 
boundaries are fluid between legal and observable firms and worker and those in the unobserved 
underground economy, they are consistent with the predictions of the different district models.  
At the national level, long term employment declines appear very similar among the 
countries studied, with the exception of Italy which has experienced relatively slower rates of job 
loss until recently. However, there are wide variations in rates of job loss at the district level and 
we observe in the United States that larger districts have been gaining employment share and that 
proximity to fashion centers and greater specialization can substantially slow the rate of job loss 
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at the district level even though the industry is declining nationally.  
Business failure appears to be occurring at about the same rate as job losses in most of 
the districts studied. However, the number of apparel establishments and fallen at a slower rate 
than in employment in the United States, both nationally and in the major garment districts of 
New York City and Los Angeles. This divergence between rates of business failure and rates of 
job loss is consistent with the industry deliberately maintaining excess production capacity for 
incentive purposes at the same time that the firms that adjust employment in the face of declining 
demand. 
Value-added, however, has clearly been growing most rapidly among the innovative 
districts as firms develop products with higher fashion content, better fabrics, and shorter product 
cycles, and increase their reliance on the outsourcing of lower value-added products. District 
models that are less engaged in innovation, as represented by New York and Roanne, have not 
been as successful in moving to higher value-added products. New York, in particular, has a 
wider range of product specializations than the other districts and it seems to be moving towards 
lower, rather than higher, value-added products. 
 However, all of these district models remain subject to competition and market discipline 
has proved an unrelenting force in the garment industry. Traditional district externalities, even 
when augmented by extra effort incentives, have their limits as buffers to competition. By 
definition, innovation and entrepreneurial conduct can trump comparative advantage, but 
innovation is risky, uncertain, and sometimes easy to imitate. Even when districts develop more 
efficient firms and stronger externalities, they often end up in competition with one another 
where their specializations overlap, as in the case of Roanne’s high end knitwear competing head 
to head with similar products made it Italy.  
Looking at the history of these districts, however, what is striking is the amount of 
change and adaptation that has occurred -- Cholet went from a textile to an apparel district and 
changed specializations several times, New York City adapted to continual ethnic and linguistic 
changes in its labor pool and has experienced many shifts in product specialization. Leicester has 
adapted to the loss of large and vertically-integrated firms that once led and the subsequent 
decline of the jobber system. Veneto adapted to the massive decentralization of production by 
large firms, and Carpi survived a failed experiment in Pronto Moda production and the more 
recent delocalization of production. The persistent market declines from globalization present a 
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severe challenge to the future of apparel districts and raise questions about whether any of the 
new district models can sustain the tradition of successively adapting to changing markets, but 
the long-term resilience of the industry and its ability to respond with radical changes when 
faced with the most severe crises should not be discounted. 
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Table 1  Apparel Employment Trends: U.S., U.K., France, Italy   
    (Employment in '000s         
                 
   U.S.  U.K.  France   Italy          
1970  1,196  357  368  370         
                 
1980  1,079  276  256  414         
                 
1990  869  157  157  415         
                 
2000  442  135  120  299         
                 
2005  243  57  88  265         
                 
% chng.                 
1970‐
2000  ‐63.0  ‐62.2  ‐67.4  ‐19.2         
1970‐
2005  ‐79.7  ‐84.0  ‐76.1  ‐28.4         
                 
U.S. = production workers 1970‐90 SIC, NAICS 2000, 2005       
Italy data for 1971, 1981, 1991, 2005           
UK data for 2004               
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Table 2A Composition of Retailing by Category       
             
  Specialty  Department Variety  Discount 
Mail 
Order  Independent 
  %  %  %  %  %  % 
U.S.              
mens  33.0  14.5  8.0  5.2     
womens  59.0  30.3  2.6  9.9     
childrens  24.8  7.0  4.5  6.3     
             
             
U.K. 2003  27.5  9.0  17.5  11.5  6  9 
             
France 2005  38.2  5.4 
see 
Spec.  15.3  8.7  18.7 
             
Italy 2005  19.3  18.4 
see 
dept.  see dept.  other 4.5  47.8 
             
             
Table 2B: Concentration Ratios In Retailing       
             
  CR3  CR4  CR5  CR8  CR10   
U.S. 2002             
Clothing (4481)    27.6    36.7     
Depart. (452111)    72.1    93.6     
Disccount (452112)    95.0    99.5     
Variety (4529901)    83.5    86.7     
             
UK 2002  22.5    28.9    41.8   
             
France 2005  18.4    26.5    39.5   
             
Italy 2005  6.5     8.6          
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Table 3: Distribution of Apparel Firms By Employment Sized Class 
      2004           
             
  %  %  %  %     
  <20  20‐49  50‐249  >249     
U.S. 2004  78.9  12.7  17.3  1.0     
             
France 2004  93.3  4.4  2  0.3     
             
Italy 2004  94.1  4.5  1.3  0.1     
             
UK 2004  88.5  8.1  3.1  0.4      
             
SME Statistics UK 2004 (excludes textiles and knitwear)     
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Chart 1 
New York City Apparel Employment
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60000
80000
100000
120000
140000
160000
1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001*
Source: Employment and Earnings
* Beginning of new NAICS series   
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Table  5A: Apparel Establishments and Employment, New York City         
                   
  Estab.  Estab.  %      Employ.  Employ.  % 
County  2000  2006  chng.        2000  2006  chng. 
                 
Bronx  60  24        1,085  358   
Kings (Brooklyn)  665  376  43      10,992  5,189  52.8 
New York 
(Manhattan)  1,568  961  38.7      30,207  14,101  53 
Queens  444  232  47.7      8,191  4,027  50.8 
Richmond (Staten Is.  6  5  16.7        60  60    
Total  2743  1598  41.7      50,535  23735  53 
                          
                 
Table  5B: Distribution of Establishments by Employment Size Class, New York City 
        Total          To
 
Estab 
<20  Estab<50 Estab>100  Estab.   
Estab 
<20  Estab<50 Estab>100  Est
County  2000  2000  2000  2000     2006  2006  2006  20
                 
Bronx  38  53    60    19  23    2
Kings (Brooklyn)  480  622    665    284  395    3
New York 
(Manhattan)  1,127  1,411    1,568    760  911    9
Queens  341  404    444    172  208    2
Richmond (Staten Is.  4  6     6     3  5    
Total  1990  2496  48  2743    1238  1542  24  15
Percent Distribution  72.2  90.1  1.7      77.5  96.5  1.5 
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Chart 2 
New York City Apparel Employment as a Share of 
National Employment
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Employment Capacity by Firm Size
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Chart 4 
Actual Production and Capacity For Fashion Production 
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Table 6  -  Firms and employment  in Veneto Apparel Industry *  (2004) 
 
 Final firms Subcontracting firms Total   
Workers  Firms   Workers    Firms   Workers    Firms   Workers   
1 - 19  489 4,286 2,152 19,383 2,641 23,669 
20 -  49  104 3,330 305 7,894 409 11,224 
50 and 
more  93 16,100 51 4,072 144 20,172 
Total 686 23,716 2,508 31,349 3,194 55,065 
*   excludes the smallest artisan  firms  without employees; 
Source: Veneto Apparel Observatory  – CREI,   2006 
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Table 7 – Main characteristics of the Carpi district, 2006 
 
    2006 
Population    92,000 
Total employees   38,000 
Knitwear and clothing industry:     
  ‐ Firms    1,158 
  ‐ Turnover (million euros)    1,273 
  ‐ Export    30.3% 
  ‐ Employment    7,278 
  ‐ Percentage of total manufacturing employment    50.0% 
  ‐ Percentage of female employment    66.3% 
  ‐ Percentage of entrepreneurs, artisans and self‐  
    employed workers 
  28.1% 
Source: R&I – Observatory of textile and clothing industry in the Carpi district, 2007 
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Table 8  − Firms and employment in the knitwear and clothing industry by size and type of firms, 
               1990‐2006 
 
  Firms  Employees 
  1990  2006  1990  2006 
  a.v.   %  a.v.   %  a.v.   %  a.v.  % 
Final firms                 
1‐9 employees  383  65.0  197  63.1  1,872  24.6  902  24.5 
10‐49 employees  189  32.1  103  33.1  3,486  45.9  1,878  51.1 
50‐249 employees  15  2.5  10  3.2  1,483  19.5  898  24.4 
250‐499 employees   2  0,3  ‐  ‐  761  10.0  ‐  ‐ 
Total  589  100,0  310  100,0  7,603  100.0  3,678  100.0 
Subcontractors                  
1‐9 employees  1,548  92.8  756  89.2  4,358  68.1  1,993  56.0 
10‐49 employees  120  7.2  91  10.7  1,987  31.0  1,514  42.5 
50‐249 employees  1  0.0  1  0.1  58  0.9  53  1.5 
Total  1,669  100.0  848  100.0  6,403  100.0  3,561  100.0 
 
Source: R&I – Observatory of textile and clothing industry in the Carpi district, 2007 
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Appendix 
The Economics of Effort Incentives in the New York City Garment District 
 
The optimization process is for jobbers maximize profits by adjusting the number of their 
core contractors (N) and the level of capacity utilization of contractor i (Ui), conditional upon the 
jobber’s volume of orders (O), the cost function of (MCi) of core contractor i, and the unit price 
of contracts (P).  
Formally, the profit function for the jobber in each time period t is:  
Max f(Nt, Uit, Ot, MCit, Pt) 
In a simple model where contractors have identical cost functions and P = MC, the number of 
core contractors (N) is a function of U for any given level of orders (O). Since jobbers do not 
produce for stock, contracting depends on the orders a jobber receives.  Once a jobber has orders 
in hand, U becomes the strategic variable of interest in maximizing profits.  
Assuming a convex profit function, jobbers will select an optimal U* which balances the 
marginal gains from the incentive efficiencies of lowering capacity utilization and the marginal 
losses from inefficiencies of contractors producing below full capacity (see Graph 1). If orders 
are declining over time, the numbers of core contractors attached to each jobber should fall, but 
more slowly than under the traditional jobber system. 
Graph 1 
The Jobber Profit Function 
Profits 
U* 100% 
Utilization Rate 
0 
 
 
In addition, the hierarchical incentives of the jobber system inhibits movements towards 
specializations that capture district agglomeration economies by delaying the exit of contractors. 
Not only do jobbers try to maintain excess capacity by allocating orders to contractors that might 
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otherwise leave the industry, but the incentives for cost-cutting in the jobber system often allow 
contractors that do not draw upon the New York garment district’s agglomeration economies to 
remain in business. SMEs in the Cholet district, however, were able to more quickly establish 
their new specialization in higher-end children’s wear, while the manufacturers that adhered to 
traditional specializations in mass-produced children’s wear and hierarchical contracting 
relationships were forced to leave the industry relatively quickly. Estimates from our study of 
garment district specialization in the United States suggest that New York City is somewhat 
below the national average in moving towards its specialization in women’s wear and that more 
rapid specialization would have reduced job losses (Rice, 2008).   
 
Methodology 
 
The New York case study draws upon survey data collected during a series of in-depth 
studies that Sarah Crean, Seth Myers, and Peter Doeringer conducted with a representative 
sample of 34 domestic apparel firms in the New York City garment district in 2003 and a 
counterpart survey in 2003 of 116 unionized apparel contractors in New York City provided by 
the UNITE trade union. The Cholet study is based on surveys conducted in 1991 by Bruno 
Courault and and a second set of surveys in 1996-1997 by Courault and Elisabeth Parat. A total 
of 113 apparel and textile firms participated in the French study, of which 38 were surveyed in 
both time periods. Materials prepared by Lynn Oxborrow are derived from on-going field and 
survey research on the garment industry of the East Midlands first under the auspices of the 
Nottingham Apparel and Textile Observatory and late at Nottingham-Trent University. Daniella 
Bigarelli and Paolo Crestanello have long-established research and policy responsibilities 
through their work with their industrial associations -- Ricerche e Interventidi Politica 
Industrialee del Lavoro (Carpi) and Centro Richerche Economiche Industriali di Vicenza. 
 
 
 
 
 
